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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff7Appellee, 
V . « 
DAVID ROGER MARKLAND, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020965-CA 
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, David Markland is challenging the 
trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress. (Brief of Appellant, dated February 24, 
2003.) The trial court ruled that the deputies in this case were justified in detaining 
Markland for a level-two seizure, warrants check, and search based on the fact that 
Markland was walking on a dark, dead-end road with two shoulder bags at 3:14 a.m., and 
the deputies had received an ambiguous report of someone crying in the area. (R. 78-
80.) The trial court applied an incorrect standard to the level-two seizure. 
Specifically, under the law, a level-two seizure may be justified if the officers 
articulate objective facts to support a reasonable suspicion that defendant is engaged in 
criminal activity. The trial court here failed to recognize that standard. (See R. 111:17; 
78-80.) Its ruling on the motion to suppress cannot be upheld. 
In addition, the state has acknowledged that the objective facts reasonably support 
innocent conduct. (See State's Brief of Appellee ("State's Brief) at 9, 10.) Neverthe-
less, the state seems to urge this Court to impose a general criminal gloss to unspecified 
"possibilities]" and "suggestions]" to justify the deputies' conduct. (See State's Brief 
at 9-10.) That would be improper. 
The record in this case fails to justify the detention based on a reasonable 
suspicion that Markland was engaged in criminal activity. (See record generally.) The 
deputies' conduct in detaining Markland for a warrants check and search was 
unconstitutional. Markland respectfully urges this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling 
on the motion to suppress. (See Brief of Appellant; also, infra subpoint B., below.) 
As a final matter, the state claims that defendant invited the error in this case. That 
claim is misplaced. At all times relevant, Markland has maintained that the deputies 
lacked reasonable suspicion to support a level-two detention for the warrants check and 
search. (See record in general; Brief of Appellant.) The state's procedural argument 
should be rejected. See infra, subpoint A., below. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE RELIES ON UNSPECIFIED POSSIBILITIES TO CLAIM 
THE DEPUTIES WERE JUSTIFIED IN DETAINING MARKLAND. 
A. TO BEGIN. THE STATE'S "INVITED-ERROR" ARGUMENT IS 
MISPLACED. 
The state begins its legal analysis in this case by citing to the "invited-error" 
doctrine. (State's Brief at 5-7.) That doctrine is not applicable here.1 At all times during 
1 In connection with its argument concerning invited error, the state has cited to State v. 
Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), and State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), and to the dissenting opinion in State v. Samora. 2002 UT App 384, ^[29, 59 P.3d 
604. (State's Brief at 6.) Dunn and Perdue compel the determination that the invited-
2 
the proceedings in the lower court, Markland maintained that the deputies were not 
justified in detaining him for the warrants check and search. (R. 65-70; 111.) 
Specifically, in papers filed with the trial court, Markland argued that pursuant to 
the law, when an officer retains possession of a person's identification for purposes of 
running a warrants check, that constitutes a level-two detention. Also, an officer is justi-
fied in conducting a level-two detention if he has articulated objective facts to support a 
reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity. (R. 65-69.) 
Markland maintained that in this case, the deputies engaged in a level-two seizure. (R. 
68.) Markland also argued that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion to support the 
seizure. (R. 68-70.) Markland's filings in the lower court support proper preservation of 
the issue on appeal. (See Brief of Appellant (raising reasonable-suspicion issue).) 
Next, during a hearing on the motion to suppress, Markland again argued that the 
deputies lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Markland for the investigation and 
warrants check. (R. 111:13-15, 17.) Defense counsel stated that the question before the 
error doctrine is not applicable here. In Dunn, the Utah Supreme Court specified that the 
invited-error doctrine "has two principal purposes. First, it fortifies our long-established 
policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error." 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220 (cites omitted). And ff[s]econd, it discourages parties from 
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on 
appeal." Id; Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205 (recognizing that a party may not appeal a jury 
instruction that the party requested at trial). Here, Markland specifically and repeatedly 
maintained in the trial court that the deputies were not justified in detaining Markland for 
a warrants check and investigation. (R. 65-70; 111:14-15.) That argument gave the trial 
court sufficient opportunity to address the matter and to grant the motion to suppress 
under the proper rule of law. In the lower court, Markland satisfied the principles 
relevant to the preservation doctrine. 
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court was whether the deputies were justified in conducting a level-two detention: "In 
order to do so, an officer has to have articulable suspicion that this person [defendant] 
has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. That raises [the encounter] to the 
level of reasonable suspicion. And as I've argued in my memorandum, even if you take 
everything that has been stated, the lateness of the hour, the area that he's in, there's just 
been a crime in the area, that is not enough for reasonable suspicion for a level two stop." 
(R. 111:14: see also 111:17 (citing State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).)2 
Thereafter, the trial court stated its basis for denying the motion to suppress as follows: 
2 In its brief, the state has emphasized the fact that Markland's trial counsel stated in the 
lower court that under a level-one stop, an officer may "stop and question the individual. 
The initial questioning is fine" (State's Brief at 6 (emphasis in original).) And trial 
counsel asserted that once an officer "takes [the individual's] identification, [the officer 
has] detained him and that has risen to a level two stop ." (Id.) 
Trial counsel's assertions were statements of law. Under the law, this Court has 
recognized that a level-one encounter occurs "when an officer approaches and questions 
a suspect. An officer may stop and question a person at any time so long as that person 
i s not detained against his [or her] will.'" State v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) (cite omitted), cert denied. 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). Also, when an officer 
takes a person's identification and retains it for a warrants check, that constitutes a level-
two detention. Salt Lake Citv v. Rav. 2000 UT App 55, W3-17, 998 P.2d 274. The 
statements were appropriate. They also were inconsequential. 
Even if counsel had made an incomplete statement of the law, that would not be 
binding on the court. See i.e., Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. Inc.. 2000 UT 14, ffl[34-40 & 44-
45, 1 P.3d 528 (ruling that a court is not bound by the stipulations of counsel concerning 
points of law), cert, denied. 531 U.S. 1011 (2000). For relevant statements of the law, 
Utah courts look to legislative and judicial pronouncements, not statements of counsel. 
Also, counsel here did what was necessary to properly preserve the issue for 
review: Counsel maintained that the deputies engaged in a level-two detention without 
reasonable suspicion. That is the central issue on appeal. 
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. . . I've made up my mind. I think there's - there are a couple of added factors 
that played into what I believe was an appropriate stop by the officer, and that is, 
[that defendant was] headed down a dead end road where he can't go anywhere, 
can't get anywhere, is suspicious enough in my own mind. And then the fact that 
he said he was going home, and his home was nowhere in the area. So you not 
only have the three factors that you just mentioned, Ms. Sisneros [citing factors in 
State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), th at failed to support 
reasonable suspicion, including: (i) late at night, (ii) defendant was in a high crime 
area, and (iii) defendant was walking with a knapsack], but those two additional 
factors that play heavy on me in terms of my belief that the officer was doing what 
he should have done appropriately. I believe he would have been remiss in not 
pursuing it further just because the whole circumstance didn't make any sense. 
He was there on a call and here's this guy that tells him he's going home? With 
no way to go home? 
(R. 111:17.) 
At that point, Marklandfs counsel again attempted to object to the matter, but was 
cutoff by the trial judge. (R. I l l : 17.) Under the circumstances, the issue was properly 
preserved. (R. 111:17); see State v. Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332,1J25 n.4, 37 P.3d 
260 (where the record showed that defense counsel tried to further object to the trial 
court's ruling and was refused, counsel properly preserved the issue for appeal). 
This Court may review the issue on the merits. To that end, Markland respectfully 
urges this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. 
B. FOR A LEVEL-TWO DETENTION, THE SPECIFIC AND OBJECTIVE 
FACTS MUST SUPPORT A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFEN-
DANT WAS INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. THE STATE'S ARGU-
MENT ON THE MERITS SEEMS TO DISREGARD THAT STANDARD. 
In its merits argument, the state maintains that the deputies here were justified in 
conducting a level-two detention with Markland. In support of that position, the state 
seems to rely on sweeping generalizations and suggestions that are not supported by the 
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specific facts of record in this case. (See infra, subpoint B. 1., herein.) 
In addition, assuming arguendo the deputies here were justified initially in seizing 
Markland, once the deputies learned that Markland had no information about the 
purported cries, they had no basis under the reasonable-suspicion standard to expand the 
detention for a warrants check. The state does not dispute that point. Thus, this Court 
may reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress on that basis. (See infra, 
subpoint B.2., herein.) 
1. While the State Acknowledges the Reasonable-Suspicion Standard, It Urges a 
Standard Here that Replaces the Specific Facts and Circumstances with Gross 
Generalizations. 
The state acknowledges that to justify the detention in this case, the deputies were 
required to articulate a reasonable suspicion that Markland was involved in criminal 
activity. (See State's Brief at 8-9.) The state asserts the following: "The reasonable 
suspicion necessary for an investigative stop . . . must be judged against an objective 
standard — that is, whether there were specific and articulable facts known to the officer, 
which taken together with rational inferences from these facts, created a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity to justify intrusion into the defendant's personal property." 
(State's Brief at 8 (citing State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, Tfl2, 988 P.2d 7).) Also, 
the state identifies guiding principles relevant to the reasonable-suspicion standard. 
First, the state specifies that this Court will judge the officer's conduct in light of 
"common sense and ordinary human experience" and it will accord deference to an 
officer's ability to distinguish between innocent conduct and criminally suspicious 
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actions. (State's Brief at 8-9 and 10 (citing State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, |^8, 47 
P.3d 932).) That principle is understood to mean that a reviewing court may not reject 
facts that the officer has identified as relevant to the matter; the principle supports the 
"totality of the circumstances" analysis. The United States Supreme Court has explained 
the principle in United States v. Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002). 
There, a border patrol agent stopped defendant and his passengers in a remote area 
on an unpaved road north of the Arizona-Mexico border. Arvizu. 122 S.Ct. at 747-48. 
The agent discovered that defendant was transporting more than 100 pounds of 
marijuana in his vehicle. Id. In trial court proceedings, defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence on the grounds that the agent lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. 
Id. The trial court rejected defendant's argument based on the following evidence. 
According to the record, Douglas, Arizona is located on the United States-Mexico 
border. Two highways lead north from Douglas: Highway 191 and Highway 80. An 
immigration checkpoint is located on Highway 191. Arvizu. 122 S.Ct. at 748. Leslie 
Canyon Road also leads north from Douglas. It is unpaved for a distance. It does not 
have an immigration checkpoint. Officers use directionally sensitive sensors on that road 
to "signal the passage of traffic that would be consistent with smuggling activities." IcL 
Drug smugglers use Leslie Canyon Road to circumvent the immigration check-
points. Id From Leslie Canyon Road, smugglers connect onto Rucker Canyon Road 
then Kuykendull Road, which allows them to gain access to Phoenix and Tucson. IcL at 
748. The Kuykendull Road in part is primitive and the last possible turnoff to avoid a 
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border checkpoint. Id. at 748. 
In January 1998, a border-patrol agent received a report that the Leslie Canyon 
Road sensor had triggered at a time when agents would have been involved in a shift 
change, leaving the area unpatrolled. Id_ The agent investigated the matter after 
receiving a report that another sensor also had triggered, placing the vehicle on Rucker 
Canyon Road. Id at 749. The agent's timing was such that when he observed a minivan 
on the road, he believed it had triggered the sensors. Also, he had not seen any other 
vehicle on the road. Id. at 749. 
The agent pulled off the road to observe the minivan drive by. He saw 2 adults 
and 3 children in the minivan. The driver appeared rigid, and two of the children in the 
back were sitting as if their knees were propped up on cargo on the floor. Id_ As the 
agent began to follow the minivan, he saw the children put their hands up at the same 
time and wave in an abnormal pattern, off and on for about five minutes. Id_ The 
waving was "'methodical,' 'mechanical,' 'abnormal,' and 'certainly . . . a fact that is odd 
and would lead a reasonable officer to wonder why they are doing this." Id. at 752. 
The agent then observed the driver turn abruptly onto Kuykendull Road. That 
was significant because the driver turned "at the last place that would have allowed the 
minivan to avoid the checkpoint." Id. at 749. Also, based on the route the minivan was 
taking, the agent could not conceive of any place for the occupants to picnic, since they 
headed away from picnic areas. The agent "radioed for a registration check and learned 
that the minivan was registered to an address in Douglas that was four blocks north of the 
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border in an area notorious for alien and narcotics smuggling." Id. at 749. The agent 
determined to stop the vehicle. Id_ During a consensual search, he discovered duffel 
bags of marijuana under the feet of the children in the back seat. Id. at 749-50. 
After the trial court denied the motion to suppress, Defendant Arvizu challenged 
the matter in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit 
reversed the trial court's ruling. Id. at 750. In doing so, it rejected many of the facts 
identified by the agent on the basis that the facts "carried little or no weight in the 
reasonable-suspicion calculus." Id. The court also ruled that the remaining evidence was 
insufficient to support the stop. Id at 750. The Supreme Court then reviewed the matter. 
It ruled that the Ninth Circuit was not at liberty to reject facts articulated by the 
agent. Such an approach served to "seriously undercut the 'totality of the circumstances' 
principle which governs the existence vel non of 'reasonable suspicion.'" Id. at 752. 
Where the agent had criminal suspicions based on his training and his familiarity with the 
specific practices in the area, the Court gave deference to the agent, and then looked to 
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there was an objective basis for 
suspecting criminal activity. It upheld the trial court's ruling. See id. at 752; see also 
U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (based on evidence of distinctive footprints in the 
desert over a particular route at specified times, officers deduced that a vehicle was 
making round trips to transport several aliens late at night during clear weather; officers 
set up a surveillance on a clear night based on the investigation, and stopped the only 
vehicle that was large enough to transport several people and that made a round trip). 
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In making an assessment in Markland's case, this Court likewise will adhere to the 
"totality of the circumstances" analysis. See Beach, 2002 UT App 160, TJ8. It will assess 
whether Deputy Spotten identified criminal suspicions based on his experience and 
training. In this case, Deputy Spotten did not. (See. record in general (no mention of 
criminal suspicions).) 
This Court then will assess the total facts and circumstances under an objective 
standard to determine whether they support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to 
justify a level-two detention. See. Beach. 2002 UT App 160, ^ 8. In this case, the total 
facts and circumstances fail to support such a suspicion for the stop. (See R. 78-80, 
where the trial court's ruling upholding the detention was not based in reasonable 
suspicion that Markland was involved in criminal activity.) 
Specifically, according to the facts, on April 30, 2001, Spotten and a second 
deputy received a dispatch call at 3:14 a.m. of cries or screams on the east side of the 
Bridgeside Landing Complex. (R. 111:3; 78, ^ fl.) Spotten testified that the east side of 
the complex "goes back" "a ways" past buildings to basketball courts, a bike path and a 
dead-end road. (R. I l l :3-4; 78, lfl[2-3.) The basketball courts were opened and acces-
sible on the side of the road. (R. I l l :5.) The bike path was gated and locked. (R. I l l : 
5; 78,1J3.) It was dark. (R. 111:8; 78, ^ [4.) The deputies did not have a particular sus-
picion one way or another with respect to the screams or cries. (See. record in general.) 
When the deputies arrived in the area, they saw Markland walking in the road 
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toward the dead end. They did not see anyone else. (R. I l l :6; see. 79,1HJ5-7.) Deputy 
Spotten asked Markland if he had heard anything in the area. (R. I l l :7.) Markland had 
not. (Id; 79, IP-10.) 
Markland was carrying two over-the-shoulder cloth bags. (R. I l l :8; 79, ^ [6.) The 
deputy asked where Markland was going, and he responded home. (R. 79, ^11-12.) 
Markland lived in the area of 1300 East and 4500 South. (R. 79,1fl2.) Spotten testified 
that he was not nsure exactly how [Markland was] going to get [home] based on the 
dead-end road." (R. 111:11; see. 79, ^  13.) He was not sure because he did not ask. (See 
R. I l l , generally.) Instead Spotten requested Markland's identification (111:9), and he 
told Markland he needed to run a warrants check. (R. I l l :9; 79, Tfl4.) Deputy Spotten 
discovered a warrant and he arrested Markland. (R. 111:10; 79, ^ (15.) During the arrest, 
the deputy found drugs, giving rise to the charges in this case. (R. 111:10; 79, J^16.) 
The deputies did not claim to have any criminal suspicions concerning Markland. 
(See record in general.) In addition, the record fails to support a reasonable suspicion 
that Markland was involved in criminal activity. Even with "deference" to the deputies 
(see Beach. 2002 UT App 160, Tf8), on this record "common sense and ordinary human 
experience" (id,) compel the determination that the trial court ruling was in error. This 
Court should reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. 
Second, the state identifies the following additional principles relevant to the 
reasonable-suspicion standard: It claims that while some of the defendant's activities may 
be explained as innocent, "'officers need not close their eyes to suspicious circum-
11 
stances/1' (State's Brief at 9 (citing Beach, 2002 UT App 160, Tfl 1); see also State's 
Brief at 10, 11.) And it claims where each of a series of acts is "'perhaps innocent in 
itself,'" taken together, the acts may warrant further investigation. (State's Brief at 10 
(citing Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 751).) Those principles again relate to the "totality of the 
circumstances" assessment, as set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
There, Officer McFadden observed Defendant Terry and two friends "go through 
a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself," but which taken together sup-
ported suspicious criminal activity warranting a level-two detention and investigation. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. The Court described the series of events as follows: 
There is nothing unusual in two men standing together on a street corner, perhaps 
waiting for someone. Nor is there anything suspicious about people in such 
circumstances strolling up and down the street, singly or in pairs. Store windows, 
moreover, are made to be looked in. But the story is quite different where, as 
here, two men hover about a street corner for an extended period of time, at the 
end of which it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or anything; 
where these men pace alternately along an identical route, pausing to stare in the 
same store window roughly 24 times; where each completion of this route is 
followed immediately by a conference between the two men on the corner; where 
they are joined in one of these conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly; and 
where the two men finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple of blocks 
away. It would have been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years1 
experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this same neighborhood to 
have failed to investigate this behavior further. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. Where the total facts and circumstances supported a reasonable 
suspicion, the officer was justified in his actions. Id 
In Markland's case, assuming arguendo Spotten had criminal suspicions relating 
to Markland (but see record in general (no indication that Spotten had criminal 
12 
suspicions relating to Markland)), as already stated, the total facts and circumstances fail 
to corroborate such suspicions for the level-two detention. (See supra, pages 10-12; see 
also. Brief of Appellant.) 
Indeed, the state acknowledges that the facts here support innocent conduct. 
(State's Brief at 10 (recognizing that the reported cry may have been "due to some 
innocent cause"), 10 (stating that carrying an over-the-shoulder bag may "appear wholly 
innocent"), 11 (recognizing that defendant may have had any number of "innocent 
explanations" for his presence in the area).) Nevertheless, the state urges this Court to 
justify the deputies' conduct. It seems to claim that this Court may place a criminal gloss 
on suggested facts and circumstances to support the reasonable-suspicion standard. 
Specifically, the state asserts that people "are not usually found walking" home on 
an isolated road at 3:14 a.m., "when home is nearly twenty blocks away." (State's Brief 
at 9-10.) The state also maintains the "likelihood" of criminal activity in this case "given 
the lateness of the hour." (State's Brief at 10). And it claims that while the facts may 
appear innocent, Markland's "possession of two 'over-the-shoulder bags'" somehow 
"added to the odds that [he] was involved in criminal activity." (Id.) 
The state's argument here seems to supplant the demand for a case-by-case 
assessment of the specific facts and circumstances for gross generalizations. That is 
improper. The demand for specific facts to justify a particular intrusion by police "is the 
central teaching of [the U. S. Supreme Court's] Fourth American Jurisprudence." Terry, 
392 U.S. at 22, n.18. "Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally 
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guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result 
this Court has consistently refused to sanction." Id at 22; State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 
761, 764 (Utah 1991) (ruling that unparticularized hunch will not support reasonable 
suspicion for a detention). The state's sweeping generalizations do not comport with the 
reasonable-suspicion standard. 
Inasmuch as the state is unable to point to specific, articulable facts to justify the 
detention and warrants check here, the detention and search cannot be upheld. (See 
Brief of Appellant.) Markland respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's ruling on the motion to suppress. 
2. The State Does Not Dispute that Even if the Deputies Were Justified in 
Detaining Markland When They First Encountered Him, the Deputies Lacked 
Reasonable Suspicion to Continue and Expand the Detention for the Warrants 
Check. Thus, the Extended Detention Was Unlawful. This Court Should Reverse 
the Trial Court's Ruling on the Motion to Suppress on that Basis. 
Next, the state claims that while the purported cries in this matter may be "due to 
some innocent cause," a reasonable person may "infer" that unspecified crime was afoot. 
(See State's Brief at 10.) Also, the state claims that the purported cries here were "more 
than sufficient to justify a suspicion of criminal activity." (State's Brief, 11; see id. at 10.) 
Markland's response to that argument is this: Assuming the state may be correct, 
the deputies should have investigated the cries. Instead, they detained and investigated 
Markland. The deputies did not have reasonable suspicion for that detention. (See 
supra, subpoint B.I., herein; also Brief of Appellant, Argument A, & p. 14 n.2.) 
In addition, assuming arguendo the investigation into the purported cries 
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somehow related to Markland, once the deputies responded to the area and learned that 
Markland had no information regarding the matter (see R. 78-79, Tffll-10), they were not 
entitled to further detain him for continued questioning or to expand the investigation to 
a warrants check absent reasonable suspicion that Markland was involved in "more 
serious criminal activity." State v. Lopez 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Chapman. 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996); (Brief of Appellant at 20-25). 
Since the deputies here failed to articulate more serious criminal activity, the ex-
tended detention was unconstitutional. Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453 (stating that no inde-
pendent facts surrounding the encounter created suspicions that defendant was involved 
in more serious criminal activity beyond that which justified the stop; thus, the officers 
impermissibly expanded the scope of the detention when they ran a computer check). 
The state does not dispute that the deputies here lacked reasonable suspicion to 
continue/expand the detention. (See. State's Brief.) Nevertheless, the state seems to 
claim that when the deputies observed Markland on the dead-end road and learned he 
was walking home, they were justified to investigate the matter. (See id. at 9-11.) That 
argument is misplaced. Without reasonable suspicion to support the continued detention, 
the deputies' were not entitled to continue the detention to ask about Markland's plans. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (specifying that officers must articulate more serious criminal 
activity under reasonable-suspicion standard to continue detention for further question-
ing); (Brief of Appellant at 13-25). In that regard, the deputies' concerns about Mark-
land's route home cannot serve to justify the expanded detention for the warrants check. 
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Next, the state asserts the deputies were entitled to run a warrants check "to assist 
[them] in assessing the credibility of the defendant's explanation." (State's Brief at 12.) 
Yet, an officer is not at liberty to use a level-two detention to assess the credibility of 
each person the officer encounters. Such a notion undermines the purposes served by the 
Fourth Amendment. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 30 (articulating reasonable-suspicion 
standard to justify an intrusion under the Fourth Amendment). 
Finally, assuming arguendo the deputies were justified in further detaining 
Markland when they had concerns as to how he would get home from the dead-end road, 
those concerns would not support expanding the detention to include a warrants check 
for two reasons. 
First, as stated in the opening brief, the deputies were required under the law to 
resolve any concerns they had about the encounter quickly and in a manner that was 
strictly tried to the circumstances. (Brief of Appellant at 20-25); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 
18-19; Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1132 (stating that the officers are required to "diligently 
[pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions 
quickly"); State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App 101,1J14, 470 Utah Adv. Rep. 63. That means 
the deputies could have asked Markland how he intended to get home from the dead-end 
road. See Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764. A satisfactory answer could have abated their 
concerns about the matter. Id. (where officer had concerns about the car, the officer 
could have asked defendant; instead the officer ran a warrants check, which was 
unlawful). The deputies here failed to do that, rendering the excessive detention 
16 
unconstitutional. See id.; Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453. 
The state disagrees. It claims the deputies were not required to ask because they 
would not have been "bound to accept [Markland's answers] as truthful." (State's Brief 
at 11.) That is unpersuasive. Common sense supports that a deputy is not entitled to 
weigh the credibility of an answer if he refuses to ask the question. 
Second, the record here fails to make any connection between the deputies' 
concerns about Markland walking home, and a warrants check. Stated another way, a 
warrants check would not have alleviated the deputies' concerns about how Markland 
would get home from the dead-end road. In that regard, the warrants check exceeded the 
scope of the justification for the stop and any additional concerns the deputies articulated 
on this record under the totality of the circumstances. See Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 
In the end, even if the deputies initially were justified in detaining Markland in 
this case, the deputies were not entitled to expand the investigation into a criminal 
computer check. That was unlawful. See Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452-53. The subse-
quent search was unlawful as well. (See Brief of Appellant.) Markland respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the deputies did not claim that they suspected any criminal activity 
either in the area or as it related to Markland. (R. I l l . ) In addition, the trial court failed 
to properly apply the law. (R. 78-80.) The deputies' encounter with Markland constitu-
ted an unlawful detention. (See Brief of Appellant, Argument A.) The subsequent 
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search also was unlawful. (Id.) Markland respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress and remand the case for dismissal. 
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